MARTIN VS. MARTIN (FAMILY)

Key holdings

• -The court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, and reconsideration may be appropriate only where a party introduces substantially different evidence or the court's decision is clearly erroneous.
• -A movant who neither introduces substantially different evidence nor demonstrates a prior decision was clearly erroneous fails to show the district court abused its discretion in denying reconsideration.
• -The denial of an NRCP 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with wide discretion afforded to the district court's ruling.
• -Under NRCP 60(c)(1), a motion seeking relief under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3) must be filed within six months of the challenged order; a motion filed more than six months after notice of entry cannot properly seek such relief.
• -Where the district court's findings on the Yochum factors are supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court will not reweigh the facts on appeal.

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a motion styled as one for reconsideration or, alternatively, for relief under NRCP 60(b), analyzing each theory under the abuse-of-discretion standard. **Reconsideration.** The court reviewed the denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion, citing AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010). It applied the substantive standard that "[r]econsideration may be appropriate where a party introduces substantially different evidence or the court's decision is clearly erroneous," Saticoy Bay, LLC v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Tr. 2007-3, 138 Nev. 335, 344, 510 P.3d 139, 146 (2022), and that only in "very rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are raised" should rehearing be granted, Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976). The district court had found the motion untimely under EDCR 5.516(a) and that a request to review the record and correct alleged errors—including asserted errors by the supreme court—was not a proper basis for reconsideration. Because Michael neither introduced substantially different evidence nor demonstrated clear error, the court found no abuse of discretion. **NRCP 60(b).** The court reviewed the NRCP 60(b) denial for abuse of discretion, citing Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018), holding modified by Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 470-71 n.6, 469 P.3d 176, 180 n.6 (2020), noting wide discretion is afforded but that a court abuses its discretion when it disregards guiding legal principles, McKnight Family, LLP v. Adept Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 129 Nev. 610, 617, 310 P.3d 555, 559 (2013). The court set out the NRCP 60(b)(1) framework—relief for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"—and its remedial character favoring adjudication on the merits, Willard, 136 Nev. at 469, 469 P.3d at 179. It recited the four Yochum factors: "(1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev. 484, 486, 653 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Epstein v. Epstein, 113 Nev. 1401, 1405, 950 P.2d 771, 773 (1997). The court also noted the district court must weigh Nevada's policy favoring merits adjudication. Rodriguez, 134 Nev. at 657, 428 P.3d at 257. Applying the framework, the court held Michael filed his motion more than six months after notice of entry of the challenged orders was served and therefore could not properly seek NRCP 60(b) relief, citing NRCP 60(c)(1) and Vargas v. J Morales Inc., 138 Nev. 384, 387-88, 510 P.3d 777, 780 (2022). The court further held the district court's findings on the Yochum factors—that the motion was not promptly filed and not shown to be filed in good faith—were supported by substantial evidence, and it declined to reweigh the facts on appeal, citing Willard, 136 Nev. at 471, 469 P.3d at 180, and Jackson v. Groenendyke, 132 Nev. 296, 303, 369 P.3d 362, 367 (2016). The opinion notes the district court additionally lacked authority to grant relief from orders affirmed by the supreme court, and that other requested relief (child support modification, repayment of overpaid support, and future attorney fees) was denied without prejudice under EDCR 5.503(a) for lacking sufficient points and authorities. In a footnote, the court stated that any arguments not specifically addressed were considered and did not present a basis for relief.

In plain language

Michael Martin and Danielle Denise Palmer divorced in 2017 and share three children, one still a minor. According to the opinion, the two have repeatedly returned to court over custody and support issues, including several prior trips to the Nevada Supreme Court. Under a post-divorce agreement, Danielle has primary physical custody and primary legal custody over certain decisions (in-network medical decisions and extra-curricular activities). In May 2025, Michael filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider three earlier orders. Those earlier orders had, among other things, denied his opposition to the appointment of a "parenting coordinator" (a person appointed to help manage co-parenting disputes) and his request for a child support review, denied his request to pause the parenting-coordinator order during an appeal, and awarded Danielle attorney fees. In his motion, Michael argued the courts had improperly used procedural rules to sidestep his constitutional rights. He also asked the court to review the whole record and fix all errors—including what he believed were errors made by the Nevada Supreme Court—and requested changes to child support, return of what he said was overpaid child support, an order about future legal fees, and changes to the custody order for drop-off and pick-up. The district court found several problems with the motion. First, it was filed very late—590 days after notice of one order and 478 days after notice of the two January orders—far beyond the 14-day window that a local court rule (EDCR 5.516(a)) allows for reconsideration motions. Second, the district court said it had no power to reconsider decisions the Nevada Supreme Court had already made. Third, the court said Michael had not pointed to specific errors on matters that had not already been handled on appeal. The district court also looked at whether the motion could be treated as a request for relief from a judgment under a rule called NRCP 60(b), which lets courts undo a judgment in certain situations (for example, mistake or excusable neglect). The court concluded it could not undo orders the Supreme Court had affirmed, and for the remaining matters, it found Michael had not acted promptly and had not shown the kind of reason the rule requires. The court denied his other requests (to change support, to get repaid, and about future fees) "without prejudice"—meaning he could raise them again properly—because they were not supported by adequate legal argument under another local rule. It also denied Danielle's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court. It held that Michael had not shown the district court abused its discretion. For a reconsideration request, he had not offered substantially different evidence or shown a prior decision was clearly wrong. For the NRCP 60(b) request, he had filed more than six months after being served with notice of the challenged orders—too late under the rule—and the district court's findings about his lack of promptness and good faith were supported by the record. Because appellate courts do not re-weigh the facts when the trial court's findings rest on substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Counsel of record

Counsel is shown when the opinion or the court's docket names it.