ORTEGA VS. ORTEGA (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -A custody determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and a district court's factual findings are upheld when supported by substantial evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment.
• -To modify custody, the moving party must show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and that the child's best interest is served by the modification.
• -A district court's detailed, factor-by-factor findings under NRS 125C.0035(4), tied to specific testimony and exhibits, will be sustained where supported by substantial evidence, and no best-interest factor must be given controlling weight.
• -An appellate court does not reweigh evidence or revisit witness credibility determinations, nor will it question a district court's resolution of a factual issue where conflicting evidence was presented.
• -S.B. 275 (codified at NRS 125C.243 and NRS 125C.245) did not warrant relief where the reunification therapy arose from the parties' 2023 stipulated decree, the challenged order added no therapy and did not remove the child from the parent's care but only expanded the other parent's parenting time, and the court considered the past-conduct evidence in its best-interest analysis.

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the post-decree custody modification for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Factual findings are upheld if "they are supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child, NRS 125C.0035(1), and the court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion, Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004).

The governing modification standard requires the moving party to show "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). The court noted that although the district court did not expressly state whether there had been a substantial change of circumstances, its findings reflected a determination that such a change had occurred.

On the contention that Ortega failed to demonstrate resolution of the underlying concerns from the decree, the court held substantial evidence supported the district court's findings that, since entry of the decree, Ortega had tested clean of drugs and alcohol, undergone therapy, completed a high conflict parenting class, and completed Dr. Bergquist's recommendations.

On best interest, the court emphasized that the district court made express, detailed factor-by-factor findings under NRS 125C.0035(4), tying determinations to specific testimony and exhibits. The district court found factors (a), (c), (d), (e), and (g) favored Ortega, and factor (k) slightly favored Medina. On factor (a) (wishes of the child), the court relied on supervised-visit reports as the only child-derived insights not presented through Medina and noted concerns of possible coaching. On factor (c), it found Medina wanted to parent in isolation, refused to abide by temporary orders, and stopped Ortega's supervised parenting time in violation of court orders. On factor (d), it found high conflict due to Medina's actions. On factor (e), it found Medina was not cooperating to meet the child's needs. On factor (g), it found Medina was preventing Ortega from providing emotional, developmental, and physical support. On factor (j) (history of abuse or neglect), the court addressed the April 2022 accidental firearm discharge and the homeschooling/educational-neglect allegation, finding the factor favored both parents and did not favor one over the other. On factor (k) (domestic violence), the court acknowledged Medina's testimony that Ortega was controlling and abusive and found the factor slightly favored Medina.

The court rejected Medina's challenges to factors (c), (j), and (k), noting Nevada "does not mandate that any factors be given controlling weight, which allows the district court discretion in determining how much weight to assign to the factors based on the facts and circumstances of the case." Roberts v. Andrino, No. 89438, 2025 WL 3119014, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025) (Order of Affirmance). It further held that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or revisit credibility determinations. See Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009); Roggen v. Roggen, 96 Nev. 687, 689, 615 P.2d 250, 251 (1980); Morrison v. Rayen Inv., Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 61, 624 P.2d 11, 13 (1981). The court observed the custody order findings were "express, tied to specific evidence, internally consistent, and each is supported by substantial evidence," citing Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996).

Regarding the medical-evidence argument, the court held the district court properly considered the records but found they did not come from the child directly and were filtered through professionals who had only interacted with Medina, while supervised-visit reports reflected positive interactions.

On the statutory argument, Medina asserted the district court violated S.B. 275, codified at NRS 125C.243 and NRS 125C.245. As enacted, S.B. 275 provides that a court order for therapy during a custody proceeding shall not "remove the child from a parent . . . or restrict contact between the child and a parent" when taken "for the sole purpose of improving a deficient relationship between a child and the other parent of the child." 2025 Nev. Stat., ch. 414, § 5, at 2657-58; see also NRS 125C.243. It also provides that "[t]he court shall, in making any finding relating to an allegation of domestic violence or child abuse, consider all relevant and admissible evidence of past domestic violence or child abuse committed by the parent who is the subject of the allegation." 2025 Nev. Stat., ch. 414, § 6, at 2658; NRS 125C.245. The court held the statute did not provide relief because the reunification therapy arose from the 2023 stipulated decree, the order on appeal added no reunification therapy and did not remove the child from Medina's care, and the district court had considered the past-conduct evidence before finding increased parenting time appropriate. The court concluded Medina failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

The court also denied Medina's motion to strike or disregard portions of Ortega's answering brief and for sanctions in its entirety.

In plain language

This case is a dispute between two divorced parents over how much time the father gets to spend with their child, who was born in May 2016. The parents divorced in August 2023 through a stipulated agreement (one both sides agreed to and put on the record). Under the divorce decree, the mother (Medina) had primary physical custody, and the father (Ortega) had supervised parenting time every other weekend and every Wednesday. The decree referenced mental health and addiction issues and said that if Ortega wanted to modify the arrangement, he should show proof of "sobriety, mental wellbeing, and the absence of problems."

In December 2024, Ortega asked the court to enforce the decree and modify custody, saying Medina was blocking him from expanding his time with the child. Medina opposed, saying more time with Ortega would worsen the child's mental health. The court ordered some supervised time and sent the parents to mediation, but they did not reach agreement. Medina then asked the court to suspend Ortega's parenting time entirely, saying the child made suicidal statements and was anxious and in distress, and she asked for sole legal and physical custody.

After a multi-day evidentiary hearing in August and October 2025, the district court decided to modify Ortega's parenting time. The court found that Ortega had not seen the child since May 2025 because Medina had not followed the supervised-parenting-time rules and had pulled the child out of school to homeschool her. The court noted that Ortega had completed parenting classes and therapy, tested clean of drugs and alcohol, and was credible when he testified. Reports from a supervised-visit center (Family First) showed the child engaged happily with Ortega, showed affection, was excited to see him, and did not show anxiety or fear during a March 2025 visit. A reunification specialist, Dr. Kathleen Bergquist, recommended moving toward increased and eventually unsupervised time.

The court ordered unsupervised parenting time for Ortega on certain Fridays through Sundays each month plus a Tuesday window, but only after Ortega completed four supervised visits first. Medina appealed.

The appeals court explained that it does not second-guess how a trial judge weighs evidence or decides whom to believe. Instead, it checks whether the trial court's findings are supported by "substantial evidence" - meaning evidence a reasonable person would accept as enough to support the decision. The court concluded that the district court's detailed findings on each best-interest factor were backed by the record, including the hearing testimony. It rejected Medina's arguments that Ortega failed to resolve the earlier concerns, that the decision ignored the child's mental health, and that the court improperly relied on observations of the child rather than her medical evidence. On the medical evidence, the court noted the records describing the child's discomfort came filtered through professionals who had only interacted with Medina, not directly from the child.

The court also addressed Medina's argument that a new law (S.B. 275) was violated. It concluded the law did not provide a basis for relief here, because the reunification therapy came from the 2023 decree and the new order did not add therapy or remove the child from Medina's care; it only increased Ortega's time. The court found the district court had considered the evidence of past incidents and still found increased parenting time appropriate. The appeals court affirmed.

Counsel of record

Counsel is shown when the opinion or the court's docket names it.