PINTO VS. PINTO-GUARDADO (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -A vexatious litigant order under NRS 155.165(1) must satisfy the four-factor analysis of Jordan - reasonable notice and an opportunity to oppose, an adequate record for review, findings that filings were frivolous or harassing rather than merely litigious, and a narrowly drawn order - and the district court's order here satisfied those factors.
• -A vexatious litigant order permitting a litigant to submit filings so long as the district court first reviews them to ensure they have arguable merit and are not intended to harass is narrowly drawn and does not amount to an abuse of discretion.
• -A contempt order requiring a parent to enroll a child in a specific school is an abuse of discretion where the same order awards sole legal custody - including education decisions - to the other parent, leaving the sanctioned parent without legal ability to comply.
• -Contempt findings included in an otherwise independently appealable order are reviewable on appeal from that order.
• -Issues decided in earlier appealable orders - including a special order after final judgment - must be raised in a timely appeal from those orders and are not properly before the court on appeal from a later order.
• -Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed forfeited, and new arguments may not be raised in a reply brief.

Practitioner summary

**Standard of review.** The Court of Appeals reviews an order declaring a litigant vexatious and restricting court access for an abuse of discretion, Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 62, 110 P.3d 30, 44 (2005), with the propriety of such an order reviewable in the context of an appeal from an independently appealable order, Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 123-24, 295 P.3d 586, 587-88 (2013). Contempt orders are likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 456, 373 P.3d 878, 880 (2016), and while contempt orders are not independently appealable, the court has jurisdiction to review contempt findings included in an otherwise independently appealable order, Vaile v. Vaile, 133 Nev. 213, 217, 396 P.3d 791, 794-95 (2017).

**Vexatious litigant determination.** Under NRS 155.165(1), "[t]he [district] court may find that a person . . . is a vexatious litigant if the person files a petition, objection, motion or other pleading which is without merit, [or] intended to harass or annoy." Because such orders limit the right to access the courts, the district court must perform the four-factor Jordan analysis: (1) the litigant must be "provided reasonable notice of and an opportunity to oppose" the request; (2) the court must "create an adequate record for review," including the reasons for the order; (3) the court must find the filings frivolous or harassing, not merely based on "a showing of litigiousness"; and (4) the order must be "narrowly drawn to address the specific problem encountered." The court held the Jordan factors were satisfied: Vanessa received notice and an opportunity to oppose but filed no response to the order to show cause and stated at the hearing she would not comply with the court's orders; the district court made a record detailing filings raising identical custody-modification and reconsideration issues; the court found her actions harassing and frivolous; and the order was narrowly drawn because it permitted filings subject to prior judicial review for arguable merit, citing O'Keefe v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 92393-COA, 2026 WL 1153666, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2026) (Order Denying Petition). The court concluded it could not find an abuse of discretion and affirmed the vexatious litigant order.

**Contempt determination.** NRS 22.010(8) provides that disobedience to any lawful court order is contempt; contempt may be imposed in a civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard, Matter of Hughes, 136 Nev. 399, 404, 467 P.3d 627, 631 (2020), and a party accused of indirect contempt has a due process right to confront witnesses and offer testimony, Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Div. of Pub. & Behav. Health v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Aliano), 139 Nev. 254, 257, 534 P.3d 706, 711 (2023). The district court's contempt order imposed $500 per day and threatened incarceration if Vanessa failed to enroll A.P. at Silvestri, yet the same order awarded Francis sole legal custody. Citing Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 420, 216 P.3d 213, 221 (2009) (sole legal custody vests basic legal responsibility for the child, including education decisions, in one parent), the Court of Appeals held the contempt directive "was not consistent with its award of sole legal custody to Francis within the same order." The district court did not explain how Vanessa could legally comply; while the court could have restricted her from interfering with Francis's enrollment of the child, it could not require her to enroll the child herself. The contempt determination was an abuse of discretion and was reversed. See Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142-43 (2015) ("[D]eference is not owed to legal error.").

**Issues not reached.** The sole legal custody award was not considered because it was not specifically challenged in the opening brief, Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011), and could not be raised for the first time in reply, Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 530 n.2, 377 P.3d 81, 88 n.2 (2016). The health insurance premium issue was set in the February 2025 order denying reconsideration - a special order after final judgment - and should have been raised in a timely appeal from that decision. Arguments concerning A.P.'s school choice, including the asserted failure to hold an evidentiary hearing under Arcella v. Arcella, 133 Nev. 868, 872-73, 407 P.3d 341, 346 (2017), should have been raised in a timely appeal from the order following the September 2024 hearing. Matters occurring after the March 2025 order were outside the record, Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981) (the court lacks the "power to look outside of the record of a case" and "cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the record on appeal").

In plain language

Vanessa Pinto and Francis Pinto-Guardado divorced in 2022 and shared joint legal and physical custody of two children. In July 2024, Vanessa asked the district court to give her primary physical custody. The court denied that request, found no change of circumstances, ordered that the older child, A.P., be enrolled in her zoned school (Charles Silvestri Junior High School), and awarded Francis attorney fees.

Vanessa then asked the court to reconsider the attorney fees. Francis responded that Vanessa still had not enrolled A.P. at Silvestri and asked the court to hold her in contempt, declare her a "vexatious litigant" (a person whose court filings are so meritless or harassing that a court restricts their ability to file new cases or motions without prior permission), and set orders about the children's health insurance. After a show cause hearing in March 2025, the district court did three things at once: it declared Vanessa a vexatious litigant, it held her in contempt - imposing a $500-per-day penalty and threatening jail if she did not enroll A.P. at Silvestri - and it gave Francis sole legal custody of the children.

On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals upheld the vexatious litigant order. The court found that the district court followed the required four-step analysis: it gave Vanessa notice and a chance to respond (she filed no response and said at the hearing she would not comply with court orders), it made a record showing her filings repeatedly raised identical custody issues, it found her actions harassing and frivolous, and it crafted a narrow remedy - Vanessa can still file documents, but the court reviews them first to make sure they have arguable merit and are not meant to harass.

The contempt ruling, however, was reversed. The Court of Appeals pointed out a contradiction in the district court's own order: the same order that threatened Vanessa with daily fines and jail for not enrolling A.P. at Silvestri also gave Francis sole legal custody - meaning Francis, not Vanessa, was the only parent with legal authority to make school-enrollment decisions. The district court never explained how Vanessa could legally comply with an order to enroll the child herself. The appellate court said the district court could have barred Vanessa from interfering with Francis's enrollment of the child, but it could not require her to enroll the child when she no longer had the legal power to do so.

Several other issues were not decided. Vanessa's complaints about the health insurance premium order and about the original order sending A.P. to Silvestri were not properly before the court because she did not timely appeal the earlier orders containing those rulings. Her challenge to the sole legal custody award was treated as forfeited because she did not raise it in her opening brief, and arguments about events after the March 2025 hearing were outside the record on appeal. The case goes back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Counsel of record

Counsel is shown when the opinion or the court's docket names it.